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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-Section 165 ( c) Loss Al• 
lowed for Securities Loaned to Brokerage Firm That Suh• 
sequently Became Insolvent and Sold the Securities to 
Meet the Claims of Creditors-Stahl v. United States* 
It is frequently said that there are only two certainties in life: 
death and taxes. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit recently upheld a district court decision1 that considerably 
eased the latter burden for plaintiff-taxpayer in Stahl v. United 
States.2 On April 12, 1962, Mrs. Stahl, a widowed musician and 
music teacher, reached an agreement with Balough & Company 
(Balough), a Washington securities firm, under which she was to 
surrender to it control of securities with a market value of approxi-
mately $210,000. Balough used the securities to meet the minimum 
capital requirements for brokerage firms established by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).3 To comply with these require-
ments, the agreement was structured to subordinate the rights of 
Mrs. Stahl to the claims of all the firm's creditors, present and 
future. As compensation for the use of the securities, Mrs. Stahl was 
to receive one per cent of the market value of the securities every 
three months. In addition, she was to receive the dividend and 
interest income that the securities produced.4 Consistent with the 
firm's policy, Mrs. Stahl was made a member of the board of 
directors of Balough shortly before the subordination agreement was 
signed. The initial agreement provided that the securities were to be 
returned on May 12, 1963, but a subsequent amendment extended 
the termination date. Prior to the extended termination date, the 
securities were sold to meet the claims of Balough's creditors and in 
August 1964 the firm filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.Ii 
In her amended tax return for 1963, Mrs. Stahl claimed an ordi-
• 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9714 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
I. Stahl v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1969). 
2. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9714 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
3. SEC Rule 15c3-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l (1971). 
4. Both Mrs. Stahl and an officer of the securities firm testified that Mrs. Stahl was 
also entitled to share in the profits of the firm at such time as profits were declared, 
Brief for Appellee at 13, Stahl v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9714 (D.C. Cir, 
1970). This fact was not disclosed in the opinions of either the district court or the 
court of appeals. For a brief discussion of the significance of profit-sharing in relation 
to capital participation, see note 67 infra. 
5. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,825. Mrs. Stahl was authorized at a special meeting of 
directors to file the bankruptcy petition. She signed the petition as assistant secretary. 
On October 15, 1964, Mrs. Stahl filed a Proof of Claim as a general creditor for $257, 
078.90, representing the market value of the securities at the time of adjudication and 
all interest and dividends accrued after the 1963 sale of the securities. In re Balough & 
Co., Inc., Bankrupt, No. 69-64 (Bankruptcy Ct. D.D.C., Sept. 20, 1971), 
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nary loss of $87,1466 under section 165(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954.7 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduc-
tion on the ground that the loss was not a loss deductible from ordi-
nary income but a loss from a nonbusiness bad debt deductible under 
section 166(d) of the Code and therefore limited to short-term capital 
loss treatment.8 Furthermore, the debt was not deductible in 1963 
because it was not wholly worthless within that year.9 Mrs. Stahl 
paid the additional assessment and brought suit for a refund. 
Both the Government and the taxpayer agreed that the loss was 
deductible. The dispute centered on the proper characterization of 
the transaction since substantial differences in tax treatment result 
from its characterization. Section 165(c)(l) provides for a deduction 
from ordinary income of losses incurred in a taxpayer's trade or 
business.10 A similar deduction is allowed under section 165(c)(2) for 
losses incurred in any nontrade or business transaction entered into 
for profit.11 If the transaction is characterized as a bad debt under 
section 166, 12 the taxpayer may receive less favorable treatment. 
6. This figure was obtained by deducting Mrs. Stahl's expected recovery in bank-
ruptcy, $39,866, from her basis in the securities, $127,012. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,825. 
Mrs. Stahl ultimately received a $19,516 recovery in bankruptcy. In re Balough &: Co., 
Inc., Bankrupt, No. 69-64 (Bankruptcy Ct. D.D.C., Sept. 20, 1971). 
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(c). Although taxpayer claimed the loss qualified 
under§ 165(c)(l) as a loss incurred in her trade or business, as opposed to a loss on a 
transaction entered into for profit under § 165(c)(2) (see text accompanying notes 10-11 
infra), the district court deemed it unnecessary to decide the issue for purposes of the 
1963 tax return and inappropriate because the issue was then before the Tax Court 
for taxpayer's 1961 and 1962 returns. 294 F. Supp. at 246. The court of appeals, however, 
did resolve the issue;· it found that the loss was one incurred in a transaction entered 
into for profit under § 165(c)(2). 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,828-29. This characterization 
was important because of the net operating loss carryover provisions of § 172 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. See note 15 infra. 
8. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 166(d)(l)(B), set out in note 12 infra. 
9. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166 (d)(l)(B), set out in note 12 infra. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.166-2(c) (1959), interpreting the requirement of worthlessness with respect to bank-
ruptcy, indicates that it is a question of fact as to what point in time the debt 
becomes worthless. Therefore, it is possible that Mrs. Stahl could not have deducted 
the loss until final settlement in bankruptcy, which occurred in 1971. See note 6 supra. 
10. Section 165 provides in part: 
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained 
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 
(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals.-In the case of an individual, the 
deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business; 
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not con• 
nected with a trade or business •••• 
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(a), (c)(l)-(2). 
11. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(c)(2), set out in note 10 supra. 
12. Section 166 provides in part: 
(a) General Rule.- • 
(1) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt 
which becomes worthless within the taxable year. 
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Should the debt be one acquired in connection with the taxpayer's 
trade or business, it is deductible from ordinary income under section 
166(a).13 If the bad debt is a nonbusiness debt, however, any loss is 
treated as a short-term capital loss under section 166(d).14 Thus, it 
is deductible only to the extent of capital gains plus a maximum of 
$1,000, with any excess carried over to subsequent years as a short-
term capital loss.15 
Mrs. Stahl was faced with the task of selecting a theory that 
would both maximize her deduction and provide her with the 
strongest legal claim. Had she contended that the transaction resulted 
in a business bad debt, Mrs. Stahl would have confronted a consis-
tently narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court of what con-
stitutes a business bad-debt deduction.16 Nor did she appear to qual-
ify for any of the limited exceptions approved by that Court, which 
exceptions have been expanded by the lower courts.17 Mrs. Stahl 
therefore chose to argue that the agreement with Balough did not 
place her in the position of creditor at all, but rather that the agree-
ment provided for delivery of personalty to be used for a particular 
purpose, after which it was to be returned.18 In a unique decision, the 
(d) Nonbusiness Debts.-
(!) General Rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable 
year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or 
exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 
6months. 
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "non• 
business debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with 
a trade or business of the taxpayer; or 
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the tax-
payer's trade or business. 
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 166(a)(l), (d)(l)(B), (d)(2). 
13. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 166(a), set out in note 12 supra. 
14. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166(d), set out in note 12 supra. 
15. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 12ll(b), 1212(b). Another important tax consequence 
hinges upon characterization. If the deduction is characterized as one incurred in a 
trade or business, either as a loss under § 165(c)(l) or as a bad debt under § 166(a), 
then to the extent that the deduction results in a net operating loss, such net operating 
loss may be carried back three years or carried fonvard five years. INT. REv. CODE 
of 1954, § 172(b)(l)(A)(i), (b)(l)(B). There is no carryback or carryover under 
§ 165(c)(2), however, because § 172(d)(4) limits net operating loss deductions to tho~e 
attributable to a taxpayer's trade or business. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 172(d)(4). 
16. See notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text. 
17. Two exceptions under which Mrs. Stahl might have argued that the transaction 
constituted a business loss are the "lender" doctrine and the "lender-employee" doctrine. 
For a discussion of the restrictive interpretation accorded the lender doctrine, which 
would exclude the Stahl situation, see notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text and 
note 49 infra. For a discussion of the lender-employee doctrine with specific reference 
to Stahl, see note 55 infra. Two additional exceptions, the "promoter" and the "sep• 
arate legal entity" doctrines, are discussed in notes 48-49 infra. 
18. See Brief for Appellee at 7-13, Stahl v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
~ 9714 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the agree-
ment between Mrs. Stahl and the securities firm created.a bailment 
and not a debt. Consequently, the full amount of the loss was deduct-
ible from ordinary income under section 165(c)(2) as a loss incurred 
in a transaction entered into for profit.19 
By its novel treatment of the transaction as a bailment, the court 
failed to give effect to the congressional purpose for section 166( d) 
as well as to recent interpretations of that section by the Supreme 
Court. The bad debt-loss dichotomy can be placed in proper per-
spective only by examining the evolution of the relevant statutory 
provisions. Initially, both bad debts and losses were deductible from 
ordinary income, although the latter were limited to losses incurred 
in a taxpayer's trade or business.20 The more favorable tax treatment 
for bad debts was reduced when Congress amended the loss provision 
in 1916 to include the deduction of losses sustained in a transaction 
entered into for profit.21 An important distinction remained, how-
ever, in that losses were deductible if incurred in transactions entered 
into for profit, if incurred in a trade or business,22 or if resulting 
from a casualty.23 A bad debt, on the other hand, was deductible 
even if the loan was made for purposes other than making a profit.24 
Finally, in 1934, the Supreme Court found the nvo to be mutually 
exclusive.25 Bad debts were regarded as a special category to be ex-
cluded from the general provisions for losses. 
The problem in Stahl stems primarily from the confusion sur-
rounding a 1942 amendment to section 23(k) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939,26 which section was the predecessor to section 166. The 
Revenue Act of 1942 added section 23(k)(4) to the Code, which dis-
19. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,827, 84,829. 
20. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 167. Actually, deductions for bad 
debts and losses date from the Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, which 
was promptly declared unconstitutional as a direct tax on income. Pollock v. Farmer's 
Loan&: Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
21. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(5), 39 Stat. 759. 
22. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(4), 39 Stat. 759, as amended, INT. R.Ev. CODE 
of 1954, § 165(c)(l). 
23. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(4), 39 Stat. 759, as amended, INT. REV. CODE 
of 1954, § 165(c)(l). 
24. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(6), 39 Stat. 759. See Waterman, Aspects of 
the Bad Debt-Loss Dichotomy, 18 TAX L. REv. 121, 128 (1962). The importance of this 
distinction has in part been reduced since the addition of § 166(d) to the bad debt pro-
visions. See text accompanying notes 26-27 infra. 
25. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 189 (1934). Lower courts 
have consistently followed Spring. See, e.g., Worthington v. United States, 70-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. 1f 9441 (D. Texas 1970); Stuart M. Sales, 37 T.C. 576 (1961); Langdon L. 
Skarda, 27 T.C. 137 (1956), atfd., 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957). A taxpayer may, however, 
allege both a loss and a bad debt in the alternative. Larry E. Webb, 23 T.C. 1035 (1955); 
Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 22 T.C. 1152 (1954). 
26. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 124, 56 Stat. 820, amending INT. REv. CODE of 
1939, § 23(k). 
404 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70 
tinguished for the first time between trade or business bad debts and 
nonbusiness bad debts and limited the latter to short-term capital 
loss treatment.27 
The Revenue Act of 1942 was part of a comprehensive tax pro-
gram designed "to raise every dollar of additional revenue that can 
be raised without seriously disturbing or shattering our national 
economy."28 Consistent with this policy, Congress said that the issue 
whether a bad debt was a business or nonbusiness debt should be a 
question of fact to be determined by interpreting "trade or business" 
in the same restrictive manner as it had previously been treated under 
the predecessor to section 165(c)(l).20 
There was yet another rationale for section 23(k)(4). The pro-
vision was aimed at a specific abuse, the "friendly" loan, by which 
a taxpayer "lends" money with no expectation of repayment as a 
ruse to qualify what is in effect a gift as a bad debt. This abuse was 
especially. prevalent in the situation where a loan was made to a 
person for whom the taxpayer was not entitled to a dependency 
exemption. It was felt that losses resulting from an unrepaid loan 
to a close personal friend, for example, should be distinguished 
from bad debts legitimately incurred in the course of a taxpayer's 
trade or business.30 It should be apparent that the use of the tradi-
tional trade or business test to eliminate friendly loans casts an un-
duly broad net. One rationalization is that difficulties of proof made 
ad hoc distinctions between bona fide loans and gifts unworkable; 
hence, the mechanical, albeit gross, distinction between business 
and nonbusiness debts was introduced.31 Nevertheless, if the central 
purpose for limiting the deductibility of nonbusines bad debts is to 
end specific abuses, use of the term "trade or business"32 to distin-
guish between business and nonbusiness debts produces the side effect 
of denying full deductions to many taxpayers engaged in legitimate 
27. INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 23(k)(4), as amended, INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 166, 
the relevant portions of which are set out in note 12 supra. 
28. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942) (testimony of Chairman Doughton). 
29. The question whether a debt is one, the loss from the worthlessness of which 
is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business, is a question of fact in each partic-
ular case, and the determination is substantially the same as that which is made 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether a loss from the tyPe of transaction covered 
by Section 23(e) [the predecessor to section 165(c)(l)] is "incurred in trade or busi-
ness" .... 
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1942). See also S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 
2d Sess. 90 (1942). 
30. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942). 
31. Id.; B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME EsrATE AND GIFT TAXATION 290 (3d ed. 1964). 
32. The term "trade or business" is not precisely defined in the Code or Regulations. 
It has received its basic interpretation through case law involving INT. REV. CODE of 
1954, §§ 162, 165, 166 and 212 and their predecessors. See 5 J. MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.31, at 126-34 (1969). 
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commercial activities. This point is amply illustrated in Stuart M. 
Sales.33 Sales was a member of a partnership engaged primarily in the 
real estate business. The partnership loaned $120,000 to a corporation 
that was marketing a new and speculative product. To obtain the 
funds for the loan, which was to produce a 12 per cent annual return, 
the partnership borrowed the money at 4¾ per cent interest. If 
the loan was repaid in accordance with the agreement, the partner-
ship stood to gain about $14,000. It was dear that the loan was made 
solely to secure profits for the partnership and not for the private 
purposes of any partner. When the borrower defaulted, Sales sought 
to deduct his distributive share of the partnership's net operating loss 
as a business bad debt pursuant to section 166(a).34 Applying an "ex-
tent of the activities" test, the court held that the making of a single 
loan was not so extensive an activity as to justify a conclusion that the 
partnership was in the business of lending money.35 Similar cases 
illustrate that other commercial ventures have been excluded from 
the scope of "trade or business."36 
If the purpose of Congress in adding section 23(k)(4) was merely 
to prevent specific abuses, it would have been more appropriate 
simply to amend section 23(k) to allow deductions for bad debt losses 
incurred in any activity pursued for the production of income.37 
If, instead, the stated purpose of raising additional revenue is con-
sidered in con junction with the congressional mandate that "trade 
or business" continue to be construed in the traditional narrow man-
ner, there is a more reasonable interpretation: the two statements 
indicate a desire by Congress to alter the tax treatment of bad debts 
by limiting the category of bad debts that can be deducted from 
ordinary income. If the latter interpretation is accepted, the relation-
ship of section 165(c) loss deductions to the bad-debt provisions of 
section 166 is clear. To allow a taxpayer to deduct what is in effect 
a nonbusiness bad debt from ordinary income by use of the former 
provision defeats the congressional purpose of limiting nontrade or 
business bad debts to short-term capital loss treatment under section 
166(d). 
33. 37 T.C. 576 (1961). 
34. Determination of income or loss to partners is governed by INT. REv. CODE of 
1954, §§ 701-08. 
35. 37 T.C. at 580. On the basis of Sales, one might conclude that if Mrs. Stahl had 
claimed a § 166 deduction, she would h«ve been relegated to a § 166(d) nonbusiness 
bad-debt deduction. 
36. See, e.g., Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (expenses incurred in 
connection with individual's investment portfolio not a trade or business, regardless 
of how large or how continuous the portfolio is); Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 
(Ct. Cl. 1960) (loss on sale of stock to key employees under incentive program denied 
to corporate officer and controlling shareholder because it is not a general business 
practice). 
37. Waterman, supra note 24, at 128. 
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A period of confusion followed the 1942 amendment, with the 
lower courts applying "trade or business" to a broader spectrum of 
situations. 38 Much of the confusion was a result of a failure on the 
part of the legislature to isolate the dominant purpose of the amend-
ment.39 In the 1954 Internal Revenue Act,4° Congress again addressed 
the distinction between business and nonbusiness bad debts, but this 
time it spoke in terms of "trade or business," without further refer-
ence to the specific abuse of "friendly" loans.41 Omission of such a 
reference might suggest a congressional intent to narrow the category 
of business bad debts. Although the congressional omission is in-
decisive at best, the Supreme Court amply clarified the matter in 
Putnam v. Commissioner.42 The taxpayer in Putnam had personally 
guaranteed a loan to a corporation in which he was a shareholder. 
Shortly thereafter, the corporation liquidated its assets and ceased 
doing business. Putnam was obligated to repay the loan and sought to 
deduct it as a loss. In holding that taxpayer was limited to a nonbusi-
ness bad-debt deduction, the Court noted that "friendly" loans were 
merely an example of the kind of deduction that the amendment was 
intended to disallow. It was equally designed to put "nonbusiness 
investments in the form of loans on a footing with other nonbusiness 
investments."43 The thrust of Putnam was clearly to limit the types of 
loans that qualify for deduction from ordinary income. 
Several years later, in Whipple v. Commissioner,44 the Supreme 
Court extended the rationale of Putnam by further restricting the 
categories of bad debts that would qualify for deduction from 
ordinary income. The taxpayer in Whipple was the majority stock-
holder and principal officer of a bottling corporation as well as an 
incorporator and investor in other corporations. As the corporation 
began to experience financial problems, Whipple made sizable cash 
38. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stokes Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1953), overruled by 
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Campbell v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 510 
(1948), overruled by Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Maloney v. Spencer, 
172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949). 
39. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40. Internal Revenue Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3. 
41. Nonbusiness bad debts continue to be treated as short-term capital losses. Two 
types of indebtedness are specifically excluded from the definition of nonbusiness 
bad debts. First, debts which become worthless in the course of the trade or business 
of the taxpayer •••. [and] [s]econd, any debt which is either created in the course 
of the trade or business of the taxpayer or is acquired by him in the course thereof 
without regard to the relationship of the debt to the trade or business of the tax-
payer at the time the debt became worthless, shall not be treated as a nonbusiness 
bad debt. 
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1954). 
42. 352 U.S. 82 (1956), discussed in Recent Development, 57 CoLu:r.r. L. REv. 577 
(1957), and Recent Development, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 779 (1956). 
43. 352 U.S. at 91-92. 
44. 373 U.S. 193 (1963), discussed in Recent Decision, 13 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 635 (1963), 
and Recent Development, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1015 (1963). 
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advances to it over a period of several years. When the debts became 
worthless, he sought to deduct them from his ordinary income as 
business bad debts pursuant to section 23(k). 
To the extent that taxpayer was a stockholder, creditor, and 
officer of the corporation, Whipple represents one of the classic 
characterization problems in the area of the bad-debt deduction when 
small, closely held corporations are involved. During the period of 
indebtedness, the corporation paid no interest or salary to the tax-
payer, and presumably no dividends.46 The taxpayer thus received 
no return in the form of ordinary income from his investments of 
time and money. Yet the substantial loans and activities of the tax-
payer may have had a significant impact upon the value of the capital 
stock of the corporation. If this were so and the value of his stock 
increased, a taxpayer such as Whipple would realize preferentially 
treated capital gains upon selling some or all of his stock in the cor-
poration. On the other hand, if taxpayer's theory were followed, any 
losses incurred on the same loans that might at one time have en-
hanced the value of his stock would be deductible from ordinary 
income.46 The Court held that when the only return to a taxpayer 
is that of an investor, he has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating 
that he is engaged in a trade or business. Merely devoting one's time 
and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not a trade or business 
of the person so engaged, but is the business of the corporation. More-
over, if full-time service to one corporation could not amount to 
a trade or business, the Court reasoned, it was difficult to understand 
how the same service to many corporations would suffice.47 The 
opinion therefore had a clearly negative impact on the promoter 
doctrine, i.e., that a taxpayer could be in the business of promoting 
business ventures outside certain narrowly defined circumstances.48 
45. 373 U.S. at 196. 
46. See Allen &: Orechkoff, Toward a More Systematic Drafting and Interpreting of 
the Internal Revenue Code: Expenses, Losses and Bad Debts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 56-58 
(1957). 
47. 373 U.S. at 202. 
48. After voicing general disapproval of the promoter doctrine, the Court summarily 
overruled eight earlier decisions in the area, to the extent they were contrary to Whipple. 
373 U.S. at 203 n.10. It then proceeded to delineate two narrow situations in which the 
doctrine might still be utilized: (1) where a taxpayer is engaged in a regular course of 
promoting corporations for a commission or fee; and (2) where promotion of the enter-
prises is for the purpose of a profit on their sale. 373 U.S. at 202-03. As an example of 
the latter situation, the Court cited with approval Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 
692 (5th Cir. 1955). Giblin involved a situation in which a lawyer, during the course of 
twenty years, provided money and about half his time to the organization and sale of 
numerous business enterprises. 
Few taxpayers have qualified under the promoter doctrine since Whipple. Compare 
United States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) (taxpayer 
held to be mere investor), with Elliott v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 521 (D. Ore. 1967) 
(taxpayer in business of promoting ventures). For a general discussion of the promoter 
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The Court went on to cite with approval several other limited in-
roads to the trade or business test;49 but it reiterated its interpretation 
of the amendment that first distinguished between business and non-
business debts: 
The 1942 amendment of section 23K, therefore, as the Court has 
already noted, Putnam v. Commissioner, ... was intended to accom-
plish far more than to deny full deductibility to the worthless debts 
of family and friends. It was designed to make full deductibility of 
a bad debt turn upon its proximate connection with activities which 
the tax laws recognized as a trade or business, a concept which falls 
far short of reaching every income or profit making activity.60 
By its highly technical characterization of the arrangement in 
Stahl as a bailment, the court ignored the thrust of these recent 
Supreme Court decisions as well as the legislative intent underlying 
section 166(d). Rather than restricting itself to the few narrow excep-
tions to the definition of trade or business sanctioned by the Supreme 
Court, the Stahl court has opened an entirely new and substantial 
loophole through which a taxpayer can more easily qualify for a 
deduction from ordinary income under the provision for nonbusi-
ness losses, section 165(c)(2). 
Although Stahl is the only decision since Whipple in which the 
taxpayer has escaped the limited deductibility provided in section 
166(d) by applying section 165(c),51 other courts have sought to 
doctrine, see Brink, How Business Promoters Can Meet the Trade or Business Test for 
Bad Debts, 23 J. TAX. 170 (1965). 
49. The Court specifically sanctioned the business of "lending money." 373 U.S. at 
204. See, e.g., Noonan v. Fahs, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9199 (D. Fla. 1958); Yeager v. United 
States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9174 (D. Ky. 1957). However, it is only under very narrowly 
defined circumstances that the courts permit such a contention. See notes 35-36 supra 
and accompanying text. The Court also cited cases involving the "separate legal entity 
doctrine," in which a taxpayer's loans to an enterprise are given business status if they 
are essential to the operation of another separate business of the taxpayer. 373 U.S. at 
203 n.11. See Maloney v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949); J.T. Dorminey, 26 T.C. 
940 (1956). The Court was less explicit in its treatment of the "lender-employee doc-
trine." 373 U.S. at 204. See notes 53-59 infra and accompanying text. 
50. 373 U.S. at 201. Since taxpayer was the owner and lessor of the real estate and 
plant in which the bottling corporation did business, the Court remanded the case for 
a determination whether the loan to the corporation was incurred in his business 
capacity as a landlord. 373 U.S. at 205. 
51. Prior to Whipple, several cases had accepted taxpayer's theory that the Code's 
loss provisions rather than the bad debt provisions should be applied to his loss, al• 
though their validity as support for the present case should be negligible. In Ansley v. 
Commissioner, 217 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1954), the president and majority stockholder of a 
corporation deposited S30,000 worth of bonds with a bank as collateral for the loan of a 
similar amount to the corporation. Unable to collect the loan, the bank sold the 
securities and taxpayer successfully deducted the loss as a loss on "a transaction entered 
fo,· profit" pursuant to § 165(c)(2). Although similar to the fact situation in Stahl, the 
viability of Ansley is questionable. See J. Meredith Siple, 54 T.C. 1, 10 (1970). Ansley 
preceded Putnam (see notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text), and Putnam has been 
interpreted as limiting stockholders to nonbusiness bad debt treatment when they pro• 
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accomplish a similar result by broadening the narrow exceptions to 
the "trade or business" test prescribed by the Supreme Court.52 
The most prominent example-prominent not only because it in-
volves the most obtrusive extension of the Court's rationale, but 
also because the attack is upon legal theory and not merely a liberal 
application of facts-is the so-called "lender-employee" theory. Un-
der this doctrine, a corporate executive's duties have been considered 
a trade or business when certain conditions are met. The Court in 
Whipple left this area untouched,53 although it expressly referred 
to Trent v. Commissioner54 as an example of the narrow circum-
stances under which such a characterization would be permitted. 
In Trent, taxpayer accepted employment in several capacities with 
two closely held corporations. As a condition of his employment 
he was required to pay $5,000 for one third of the stock in one 
of the corporations, and he was informed that, from time to time, 
he would be required to make loans to the corporations. In return, 
he was to receive a salary. Over a period of several years, taxpayer 
made eleven loans to the corporations in amounts that greatly ex-
ceeded his investment. Several times he was advised that failure to 
make the loans would result in his termination as an employee. The 
discrepancy between the large value of the loans and taxpayer's small 
investment in the corporation, as well as the fact that his annual 
salary was well in excess of his capital contribution, made it apparent 
that taxpayer's primary motivation for the loans was to retain his 
status as an employee. The Second Circuit held that when loans are 
made in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business of rendering 
vide debt financing to the corporation in order to protect or enhance their proprietary 
interest. This is true whether or not there is a technical subrogation as existed in 
Putnam. Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 
951 (1970); United States v. Hoffman, 423 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1970). Although the district 
court in Stahl relied heavily upon Ansley in reaching a verdict for taxpayer, 294 F. 
Supp. at 245, the court of appeals noted its doubtful validity and affirmed on other 
grounds. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,828-29. 
In Starr v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1959), taxpayers advanced money to 
a partnership in return for one sixth of the partnership profits at the end of three years 
with the principal to be repaid at the same time, regardless of losses. Without citing 
any authority, the court found this to be a profit-sharing arrangement and granted a 
deduction pursuant to § 165(c)(2). The brevity of the opinion and the fact that it 
preceded Whipple cast doubt upon the validity of Starr as meaningful precedent for the 
Stahl decision. See also First Natl. Bank v. Smith, 141 F. Supp. 722 (D. Pa. 1956); 
Larry E. Webb, 23 T.C. 1035 (1955); Charles S. Guggenheimer, 8 T.C. 789 (1947); Water-
man, supra note 24. 
52. There is seldom any need for a lower court to confront directly the legal frame-
work established by the Supreme Court. The test prescribed in Treas. Reg. § l.166-5(b) 
(2) (1959) ("The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in 
each particular case."), based on the rule of Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 
(1941), affords a lower court sufficient latitude so that it can make a liberal application 
of existing law in any context. 
53. 373 U.S. at 204. 
54. 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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services for pay, the resulting losses are bad debts deductible from 
ordinary income under section 166(a).65 Following Trent, two circuits 
held, in similar situations, that when the tax.payer's primary or 
dominant motivation for making the loan was to ensure his status as 
a corporate employee, he might deduct resulting losses as business bad 
debts.56 However, other courts, including the Second Circuit, have 
held that to qualify as a business bad debt retention of employment 
need be merely a significant motivation for the loan, a ruling that 
expands the narrow limits of Trent and Whipple.67 The same contro-
versy has arisen in the Tax Court.68 The Supreme Court apparently 
deems the discrepancy to be significant since it has recently accepted 
the issue on certiorari.59 Thus, while the Stahl court is not alone in 
its attempt to expand the kind of losses that are deductible from ordi-
nary income, it appears to have deviated further from the express 
policy of the Supreme Court than have other courts by creating an 
entirely new category. 
With the dominant policy implications of Stahl thus outlined, 
it remains only to examine the court's rationale in holding that the 
relationship between Mrs. Stahl and the securities firm was not in 
55. 291 F.2d at 676. It is interesting to note that Trent might be construed as author-
ity for the proposition that Mrs. Stahl was engaged in a trade or business. The crucial 
issue would be whether her activities as a director of Balough were significant enough, 
and her remuneration rewarding enough, to support a conclusion that her dominant 
motivation for making the loan was to acquire or protect her directorship. It is unlikely 
that this was the case, and perhaps for that reason the taxpayer chose not to raise the 
point. 
56. Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 
(1970); Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969). 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 
U.S. 972 (1971); Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963). 
58. Compare Isidore Jaffe, 26 T.C.M. 1063 (1967) (significant motivation), with Ida 
Rosati, 29 T.C.M. 1661 (1970) (primary motivation). 
59. United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970), cel't. granted, 401 U.S. 972 
(1971). The taxpayer was a 44% stockholder and the chief officer of a close corporation 
engaged in the construction business. To obtain the requisite performance and payment 
bonds for the corporation, taxpayer e.xecuted a blanket indemnity agreement with the 
guarantor. The corporation defaulted on two contracts, and the taxpayer was forced to 
pay approximately $162,000 to the guarantor. He sought to deduct the loss as a business 
bad debt pursuant to § 166(a)(l), but the Service disagreed. The issue ultimately pre• 
sented on appeal was whether the judge had correctly charged the jury: 
A debt is proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or business when its creation 
was significantly motivated by the taxpayer's trade or business, and it is not rendered 
a non-business debt merely because there was a non-qualifying motivation as well, 
even though the non-qualifying motivation was the primary one. 
427 F.2d at 289 (emphasis added). The test to be applied was quite important since tax• 
payer received less than one third of his annual income as salary from the corporation 
and he spent only six to eight hours per week pursuing corporate business, Indeed, he 
had another full-time job. 427 F.2d at 280. Affirming the jury verdict in favor of tax• 
payer, the court of appeals accepted the "significant motivation" test. 
In light of Whipple (see notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text), it is likely that 
the Supreme Court will reject the "significant motivation" test in favor of the narrower 
"primary motivation" test. 
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fact one of debtor and creditor. Perhaps the simplest, and yet the 
most convincing, argument relied upon by the Government was that 
ancient terms derived from Roman and common law should not be 
determinative of tax consequences.6° For purposes of determining 
whether a loss is deductible under section 165 or section 166, the term 
"bailment" serves no useful purpose. The principle that common-law 
distinctions are not determinative for tax purposes has been uni-
formly recognized since the Supreme Court first confronted such 
distinctions in Burnet v. Harmel.61 The issue presented in that case 
was whether Texas law should control the classification of a bonus 
payment on an oil and gas lease as a gain from the sale or exchange 
of a capital asset. Taxpayer contended that such treatment was 
appropriate since Texas law characterized the initial bonus payment 
as a sale of oil and gas in place. The Court stated, inter alia: 
For the purpose of applying this section [ of the Internal Revenue 
Act] to the particular payments now under consideration, the Act 
of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular charac-
terization of the payments in the local law. . . . The fact that title 
to the oil and gas is said to pass before severance, rather than after, 
is not [determinative]. The economic consequences to the lessor of 
the two types of lease are the same. 62 
The same result has been reached by the Court with respect to prin-
ciples of conveyancing; the intention of Congress as manifested in 
the Code has been held to override such common-law distinctions, 
which were originated under a feudal economy and which "are pecu-
liarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures."63 
The economic significance of the transaction in Stahl supports 
characterization as a loan rather than a bailment. The agreement 
was framed to allow Balough to meet the net capital requirements of 
the SEC. The relevant provision explicitly permits only cash and 
liquid assets (excluding all fixed assets) to be used in computing net 
capital.64 It is inconsistent to argue for tax purposes that the trans-
action was a bailment rather than a loan because personalty and not 
cash was involved, while contending for SEC purposes that the secur-
ities fulfilled the requisite net capital requirements since they were 
liquid assets closely approximating cash. But more significant than 
60. Brief for Appellant at 10-12, Stahl v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9714 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
61. 287 U.S. 103 (1932). See also Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953); Estate 
of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393 (1945); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 
(1940); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938). 
62. 287 U.S. at ll0-ll. 
63. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, ll8 (1940). 
64. SEC P.ule 15c3-l(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(c)(2) (1971). 
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consistency is the mere fact that the very substance and purpose of 
the transaction was a loan. 
Rather than directly addressing the bailment argument, the 
court of appeals chose to deal with it only by negative implication 
and addressed itself to the alleged flaws in characterizing the trans-
action as a bad debt. The court first considered Treasury Regulation 
1.166-l(c),65 which states that only a bona fide debt qualifies for 
deduction under section 166. The same section goes on to state 
that a gift or contribution to capital shall not be considered a bona 
fide debt. This qualification reveals the purpose for requiring a 
bona fide debt. Congress meant only to exclude two categories of 
transactions from section 166, and its intent was summarized by the 
Senate Finance Committee: "The applicability of subsection (d) of 
section 166 still depends upon the existence of a bona fide debt 
as distinguished from a gift or a contribution to the capital of the 
corporation."66 The bona fide requirement should be of little conse-
quence in Stahl, since the court did not suggest that Mrs. Stahl's 
action constituted either a gift or a contribution to capital.67 
Apparently, the court seized upon the regulation instead because 
of its language that a debt must be based on a "valid and enforce-
able obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."68 The 
court felt the conditional nature of the obligation of Balough to pay 
a fixed sum of money necessarily disqualified the transaction from 
any deduction under section 166(d).69 The obligation to pay a fixed 
sum was conditional because it could not be assumed that Mrs. 
Stahl had given Balough the option to return either the securities 
or the cash equivalent. The return of a cash equivalent would neces-
sitate that Balough have discretion to choose the timing of the sale 
and this, the court reasoned, was too important a decision to be 
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-l(c) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6996 Gan. 17, 1969). 
66. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1954) (emphasis added). 
67. Mrs. Stahl did argue that she and Balough were engaged in a joint venture and 
her status was that of a limited or silent partner. She argued that sharing in the profits 
of the corporation was a characteristic of a partner and not a lender. Thus, her loss was 
one incurred in a trade or business. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Stahl v. United States, 
70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9714 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Irrespective of the merits of the joint venture 
argument, the Government could have used this argument to its advantage. Since tax• 
payer's contribution was admittedly subordinated to the claims of creditors, and since 
it entitled her to share in the profits of the corporation, it conceivably was a contribution 
to capital. B. BIITKER 8: J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 4-10 to 4-15 (3d ed. 1971). If the Government had made and been upheld 
on such an argument, any loss sustained by Mrs. Stahl would have eventually resulted 
in long-term capital loss treatment. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 165, 12ll(b), 1212(b). 
The Government's position would also have been strengthened by the fact that Mrs, 
Stahl and other subordinated creditors took over the operation of the firm approximately 
a year before bankruptcy when the principal officer and stockholder suffered a heart 
attack. Interview with Referee of Bankruptcy Court, Nov. 10, 1971, District of Columbia, 
68. Treas. Reg, § 1.166-l(c) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6996 Gan, 17, 1969), 
69. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,826-27. 
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implicitly delegated.70 The actual agreement between Mrs. Stahl and 
the securities firm could, however, just as easily be interpreted to 
mean that while the firm did possess the power to sell, it was obligated 
to return the securities or their equivalent in cash or comparable 
securities on the date of termination of the agreement.71 Under such 
an interpretation, Balough was obligated to repay Mrs. Stahl on a 
specific date at a value to be determined by market forces. The spectre 
of unbridled discretion in timing and hence in cash recovery should 
be disregarded. 
The court of appeals next focused on the fact that even the 
obligation of the brokerage firm to return the securities was subject 
to a condition because 
Mrs. Stahl expressly agreed to subordinate her right to return of the 
securities to the claims of all creditors of Balogh, agreed that they 
would be "subject to the risks of Balogh's business," and ... agreed 
that" ... [the] agreement may not be terminated, rescinded or modi-
fied by mutual consent or othenvise [if the result would be incon-
sistent with the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission ].''72 
Although the court cited several cases which hold that the bad-debt 
provisions are applicable only in the case of an unconditional obliga-
tion, each of those cases was concerned with the bad debt-capital 
contribution or gift conflict, and not the bad debt-loss dichotomy.73 
In the capital contribution cases courts are concerned not only with 
that limited problem but also with a variety of additional factors in 
determining whether the substance of the transaction is really an 
equity investment by the taxpayer.74 In any event, it was particularly 
inapposite for the court to cite United States v. Henderson,75 for in 
that case the court had distinguished a conditional obligation to re-
pay from a debt for the purpose of invoking capital-loss treatment for 
the transaction. The Stahl court mistakenly applied the reasoning 
of the capital-contribution cases to justify a deduction from ordinary 
income. Moreover, it is likely that the "subject to the claims of 
creditors" provision in the loan agreement was intended merely to 
subordinate Mrs. Stahl's loan to the lowest priority rather than to 
70, 70·2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,826. 
71. 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,826. 
72. 70·2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,827. 
73. United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 
(1967) (debt v. contribution to capital); Zimmerman v. United States, 318 F.2d 611 (9th 
Cir. 1963) (debt v. contribution to capital of nonprofit organization); Gilbert v. Com-
missioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (debt v. contribution to capital); Milton Bradley 
Co. v. United States, 146 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1944) (question of bad debt moot as tax• 
payer failed to file timely claim for refund). 
74. These considerations were codified in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See INT. REv. 
CODE of 1954, § 385. See also S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1969). 
75. 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967). 
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eliminate the need for repayment.76 If, on the other hand, the court 
was correct in assuming that Balough was under no duty to repay, 
then the transaction may, indeed, have been a contribution to capital 
and should have been treated as such.77 
Despite earlier confusion over its purpose, section 166 has been 
consistently defined by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. Both have felt that the deduction from ordinary income pro-
vided for business bad debts should be limited to only those debts 
incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business. All other bad debts, 
except for certain narrow exceptions sanctioned by the Court, should 
receive short-term capital loss treatment. Although several lower 
courts have expanded the limited exceptions established by the Su-
preme Court, none has gone so far as Stahl. For many purposes the 
liquidity of securities makes them a ready substitute for cash. Thus, 
for many taxpayers it would be advisable merely to change the form 
of the loan agreement by lending securities rather than cash and 
thereby receive the preferential tax treatment of section 165 should 
a loss result from the transaction. Such a device would be particularly 
attractive to the shareholder-creditor, who receives the best of both 
worlds: if his loan adds to the prosperity of the corporation, he re-
ceives the bulk of his gain through enhancement of stock value 
that will eventually be taxed at low capital gain rates; if, on the other 
hand, the corporation fails, he can deduct his loss from ordinary in-
come under the Stahl rationale. Although the equities of Mrs. Stahl's 
situation may heavily favor her case, 78 the decision ignores Congress' 
intent as interpreted by the Supreme Court and provides an ominous 
precedent for abuse of the tax laws. 
76. A strong argument can be made that the loan by Mrs. Stahl was not, in fact, 
conditional in the traditional sense. Under the discernible provisions of the loan agree• 
ment, Mrs. Stahl was not to be repaid only if two conditions occurred: (I) the firm 
became insolvent; and (2) after all other creditors were paid, no funds remained. Thus, 
her status was merely one of a low priority creditor who, like any other creditor, sub• 
jected her money to the ultimate risk of insolvency, The fact that Mrs. Stahl claimed 
full recovery in bankruptcy as a general creditor supports the contention that she ex• 
pected to recover the full amount of the securities. See note 5 supra. 
For examples of conditional obligations, see Zimmerman v. United States, 318 F.2d 
611 (9th Cir. 1963) (repayment only when recipient could carry itself financially); Lowci 
& Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1956) (customer not legally obligated to 
pay difference between contract price and market value until stock was actually issued 
when taxpayer-stockbroker bought "when, as and if issued" contracts to buy stock); S.S. 
Bercaw, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948) (repayment only if recipient realized proceeds from 
a lawsuit). !Jut cf. Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. v. Kanne, 190 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1951), 
77. See note 67 supra. 
78. Although the court of appeals did not discuss the point, the district court 
appeared to be influenced by the equities in favor of Mrs. Stahl. The lower court noted 
that the elderly widow had been the victim of "reprehensible" overreaching by Balough. 
United States v. Stahl, 294 F. Supp. 243,246 (1969). 
